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One of the most controversial issues preoc-
cupying the Croatian public opinion since autumn
1996, and likely to continue doing so in the' fu-
ture, is the report on the regional approach to a
group of Southeast European countries, covering
the Republic of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia
and Albania, prepared by the Foreign Relations
Commission of the General Directorate Ia of the
European Commission and adopted by the Coun-
cil of Ministers at the meeting of the Ministerial
Council, in Luxembourg, 28 October, 1996.
The consensual integration of a number of
sovereign state entities, sometimes as a result of
pressure, which was formerly motivated by dynas-
tic, defence or economic considerations and more
recently to prevent war or conflict between them,
is being replaced by association and the creation
of larger market, customs, trade and investment
zones.
Almost the entire Croatian history, which
may be viewed as tragic or as the art of survival of
a small and threatened people, is filled with vari-
ous kinds of association, accompanied by a more
or less voluntary forfeiture of sovereignty: from
the Pacta conventa', the Convention of Tsetin/,
the Pragmatic Sanction", the National Council",
and up to the meeting of ZA VNOH5 and the
present day, on the eve of the process of integra-
tion with the European Union.
In order to keep alive what was left of the
devastated and decimated Kingdom of Croatia,
and perhaps to reclaim one day the lost lands, lack-
ing adequate troops and money, a large part of
the Croatian nobility, probably reluctantly, joined
their Hungarian peers in a primarily defensive
alliance with the southern and south-eastern duch-
ies of the German Roman Empire, ruled by the
Austrian branch of the House of Hapsburg, with
the logistic centre for Croatia at Graz. This fate-
ful decision resulted in much grief, the fragmen-
tation of the Kingdom, the creation of the mili-
tary zone at Karlovac commanded byAustrian and
German generals and of the Kraina borderland,
settled by Orthodox peoples from the Balkans,
and the loss of Dalmatia. After the defeat of the
Ottoman Empire, what was for the Croats a
mainly defensive union, gradually turned into a
state structure dominated by the Hungarians and
Austro-Germans. The Croats, concerned about
the fate of the annexed Dalmatia, Rijeka and
Istria, and wishing to achieve equality by creating
a larger grouping, began to dream about linkage
with what they thought to be "related southern
Slavs" in their immediate vicinity.
This linkage, which was to last for 70 years,
briefly interrupted by the ephemeral Independent
State of Croatia, could have produced even more
tragic consequences for Croatia than the Turkish
incursions and destruction.
And just now, when the protracted histori-
cal process, initiated in 1527, of reclaiming all
Croatian lands and uniting them into a sovereign
Croatian state is nearing completion, a new po-
litical project is being touted on the European
political market, a project which, presented in in-
creasingly milder versions, produces apprehen-
sion, outrage and disappointment in all people in
Croatia, from the government and parliament to
the vast majority of the population.
PROJECT OF THE POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION
To be true, this project of "reconciliation
and economic and communication linkage" of
countries east of Slovenia, conceived by the bu-
reaucratic strategists from the European Commis-
sion, cannot be compared with the voluntary or
forced institutionalised unions of Croatia in the
past, but all our recent experiences produce in us
not only emotional rejection but also rational cau-
tion.
The paradox of this project is that, at the
end of the past century and during the first two
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decades of this century, it would have been en-
thusiastically welcomed by the larger part of our
political and intellectual circles. The same could
be said of the days of the so-called "Croatian
spring", whereas today it can only provoke indig-
nation and disillusionment.
Let us try and cast a sober and realistic
glance on some facts, even if we don't like them.
The rebellion of the Croatian Serbs, the
aggression from Belgrade, the war and our in-
volvement in favour of the Croatian minority and
interests in Bosnia and especially in Herzegovina,
were driving Croatia farther and farther apart
from Slovenia and from the other Visehrad coun-
tries. After the Washington and Dayton accords,
moreover, Croatia was being driven closer and
closer to the Balkans, similarly to the manner in
which it was occupied and later annexed by
Austro-Hungary after the Berlin Congress, with
German support -with the difference that Austro-
Hungary was a Central European power.
The virtual balkanisation of Central Euro-
pean Croatia began at the end of 1918, with the
entry into Zagreb of the Serb army, with the set-
ting up of the armed forces and the gendarmerie
and of local administration over the whole
Croatian territory after the Serb model and staffed
by Serbs. This balkanisation received added im-
petus during the forty-five years of the commu-
nist regime in Yugoslavia, imbued by a Balkan
mentality and accompanied by a mass exodus of
the Croat elite, raised on Central European tra-
dition.
If Croatia was submitted to "creeping
balkanisation", reinforced by an influx of refugees
from Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the
Independent State of Croatia, after 1945 and dur-
ing the recent war, aswell as by the arrival of larger
numbers of Croats from the Dinara region, then
we must admit at the same time that Northwest
Serbia, in Voivodina, Novi Sad, Zemun and West-
ern Sirmium possesses certain Central European
traits which enable it, when necessary, to stress
its position as a link with the Danubian region. It
would appear that the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia plans to invoke its geopolitical position
and predominance in terms of population in or-
der to assume one day a central role in the region
between Zagreb and Saloniki.
"The Croatian Central European Serbs",
especially after the reintegration of Eastern
Slavonia and the return of a portion of the Serbs
who fled after Operation Storm, will constitute
the most numerous and the most important mi-
nority in Croatia, and thereby strengthen the "re-
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gionallinks" with the Federal Republic ofYugo-
slavia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This tendency will be reinforced by
the economic gravitation of the western part of
the Republika Srpska around Bihac towards the
Republic of Croatia, as well as by our own inter-
ests in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.
After the Illyrian dreams of a Croato-
Serbian coalition, the Yugoslav Committee in
exile, the self-suffocation of the Croatian Conven-
tion, after accession to the Kingdoms of
Karagjorgjevic and Petrovic- Njegos, and finallyby
the creation of Yugoslavia, in the natural course
of things, albeit reluctantly, Croatia developed
more economic, communication, sports, and even
family links with the majority Balkan part of the
former Yugoslavia than its public iswilling to ad-
mit.
Like it or not, also in the future; the Croats
will continue to maintain more particular and
mutually stimulating relations with the Serbs,
Bosnian Moslems and Montenegrins than with,
e.g., the Hungarians, Austrians and even the
Slovenes.
The world public opinion, the media and
the major international factors and decision-mak-
ers do not wish to take into consideration the "pre-
1918 phase", viewing instead things from the van-
tage point of the familiar recent past. And this
recent past, for most of these international fac-
tors, was at first glance a history of four decades
of coexistence of all former Yugoslav ethnic
groups within a single state structure without any
major dispute.
They are more interested in the realities of
the current geographic and communication logic
of the area between Zagreb and Saloniki, and in
the neuralgic spots in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Mostar, Brcko, Sandzak and Kosovo, which are
not likely to die out for many years to come, than
in our historicist Central European sentimental-
ity, especially since we contributed to the destruc-
tion of a functioning Central European common-
wealth of peoples, after having been one of the
initiators and co-authors of Yugoslavias of all
shapes and hues.
They show little interest in historical inter-
pretations, the Kosovo myth and the term "bul-
wark of Christianity" only produce a semi-polite
smile, and the same goes for the complexities of
the Croato-Serbian conflict; they have even less
understanding of the much more complex prob-
lem of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except that it
places us beyond the Balkan pale.
10
The international political and economic
factors apply a pragmatic approach in assessing
the present situation in terms of potentials for
future cooperation, regardless of possible histori-
calor mentality preferences. However, this is not
to say that Croatia should give up its efforts to
inform the public that this part of the world has
long been divided into two antagonistic cultural
and political groupings, one oriented to the Euro-
Christian and the other to the Byzantine and Ot-
toman cultural and political heritage. It is on this
foundation of tragically opposing mentalities that
the conflicts of today have erupted - but this does
not mean that present-day Croatia is not inclined
towards a gradual reconciliation and linkage of
this divided area.
The gradual dissemination and acceptance
of democratic values and tolerance among the
younger generations, side by side with the unifor-
mity of the way of life typical for the Euro-Atlan-
tic consumer society, and combined with the in-
fluence of the Anglo-Saxon entertainment indus-
try, the culture of electronic media, Internet etc.,
can be expected to intensify the tendency of open-
ing and integration.
After World War II, in the then conflict-
free region of the former Yugoslavia, a tough,
complex and prolonged conflict was going on, a
conflict in which, regardless of who was to blame,
regardless of the culprits and the victims, the Serbs
were the main factors in all parts of the region,
followed by Montenegrins, the Moslem Bosniaks
and the Croats. The Albanians were also among
these factors, especially those in Kosovo. In the
eyes of the international community, the Slovenes
are not a factor, and have no place in this vicious
circle of conflict.
Europe, highly preoccupied with its own
complicated transformation, the creation of a new
Maastricht Treaty at the forthcoming summit in
Amsterdam, beset by problems with Great Brit-
ain, the monetary union, unemployment, social
problems, budget deficits, difficulties with the fi-
nancing of pensions, health services, education,
research, agriculture etc., is currently not inter-
ested in expansion and in negotiations with indi-
vidual candidates. Even when it makes declara-
tory promises, they have a hollow, unconvincing
sound. Let them first integrate into larger group-
ings, on a regional basis; let them first settle rela-
tions with their neighbours; let them meet the
conditions, and only then, step by step, by easy
stages, they might start joining a newly fashioned
European Union in its new shiny armour. Europe
is in no hurry, and the regional approach, with
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the new conditions this imposes, offer excellent
excuses for procrastination. Moreover, Europe is
no longer willing to admit some "poor relations",
as it did with Greece or Portugal, but wants eco-
nomic peers, who will not constitute an incessant
drain on the expensive, jointly financed develop-
ment funds and subsidies. Actually, it was devel-
oped countries like Austria, Sweden, Denmark
and Finland who were the last to be welcomed
into the extended circle of the Founding Six un-
der the old terms.
THE CONCEPT OF
THE REGIONAL ASSOCIATION
The substance of the concept of regional
association is, in the view of the Fifteen, to be
found in the philosophy underlying the construc-
tion of the European Union. This philosophy is
based on two ideas:
1) putting a definite end to all wars and
achieving a lasting reconciliation of the European
nations; the Treaty of Versailles kept up a spirit
of vengeance, and nationalisms led to economic
protectionism and war;
2) a firm reconciliation is to be attained by
a gradual process of integration, starting with eco-
nomic association and ending one day in volun-
tary political integration.
For Western Europe, the road from the
original six to the present-day sixteen EU mem-
bers led through several stages of economic inte-
gration, from the Coal and Steel Community, the
Customs Union, the single market, the Maastricht
Treaty and up to the monetary union in 1999.The
political and defence unions are only in their ini-
tial stages, lagging much behind the economic uni-
fication, with the result that the EU still does not
constitute a single political and defence world
power.
All nations wishing to become members of
the European Union have to accept the objectives
and frame of reference of this European regional
integration, which comprises common institutions
and adopts European laws that supersede national
legislations but does not preclude the political
identity of nations.
No United Nations of Europe are being
constructed for the time being, but rather a com-
monwealth of peoples built on a unique pattern:
joint exercise of national sovereignty in an agreed
number of areas vital for their common prosper-
ity and influence.
The EU is aware, furthermore, that after
the end of the cold war and the collapse of the
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communist bloc most countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, including the Baltic countries,
aspire to join the Union. In 1993, at the time of
the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia
and of the barbaric ethnic cleansing that accom-
panied it, the EU agreed in principle to such ma-
jor expansion. However, the Union first wishes to
complete its own transformation before enlarg-
ing its membership, so as not to change its main
direction and character and without renouncing
its final political goal.
Apart from some statements made by some
important individuals, the states which emerged
from the collapse of Yugoslavia, with the excep-
tion of Slovenia, have been referred to as poten-
tial members, but at some undefined time.
To evade the welcoming attitude shown by
the EU in 1993 towards the countries of the
former Warsaw Treaty, with the "neutral"
Slovenia easing itself into that space during the
hostilities between Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia, a new formulation
was made up for that area, claiming that regional
association was at the basis of the original Euro-
philosophy and would henceforward be applied
to future admissions to the EU. It is further
emphasised that this attitude is not new with re-
gard to economic cooperation, with political links
looming in the background, between the countries
of the former Yugoslavia.
Jacques Delors attempted in the summer
of 1991 to win over the contending and centrifu-
gal republics of the former Yugoslavia by offer-
ing them 5 and a half billion US dollars to join
the then European Community "en bloc" as a
single confederation and within their existing bor-
ders. Lord Carrington's plan contained, among
other things, conditions of economic cooperation
that the republics emerging from the former Yu-
goslavia would have to meet in return for the rec-
ognition of their political independence by the EU
and its members. Later on, David Owen and his
co-chairmen also nurtured ideas of association for
that warring region.
The Dayton Agreement stresses good
neighbourly relations, reconciliation and
stabilisation of the entire Balkan region as the
main goals, stipulating the establishment of eco-
nomic links at regional level, the protection of
minorities and a number of other conditions in
return for assistance by the international commu-
nity.
Since all the republics of the former Yugo-
slavia have expressed the wish to become mem-
bers, the EU wants to remain consistent to its cus-
,
11
tomary logic of admitting associate and full mem-
bers, even including the pre-associative period, by
progressive stages, especially in the conflictual ex-
Yugoslav region. In addition, this procedure is
today made even more dependent on over-the-
boundary regional cooperation, some kind of
beneluxisation, only then to be followed by asso-
ciate and finally gradually by full membership sta-
tus.
THE REGIONAL ApPROACH
In the case of Croatia, the regional approach
. possesses yet another particular background and
connotation. It is the Dayton accord, the Bosnia-
Herzegovina problem, that unresolved Gordian
knot in Europe, of which everybody thinks - but
does not say aloud - that Dayton does not offer a
solid solution.
Ethnic cleansing, 250 thousand dead, one
and a half million displaced persons, floods of
refugees, scenes that not only CNN but almost all
channels directly transmitted to the Euro-Atlan-
tic homes of politicians and consumers have left a
deep impression on everybody. This is not so much
motivated by sentimental, moral or humane rea-
sons as by the determination to avoid at all costs
a repetition of such an outrage in Europe, with
the possibility of new floods of refugees, even
though smaller than before. Europe does not want
to be confronted yet again with discord in its own
ranks and with the sad picture, or rather carica-
ture, of its own unreadiness, impotence and fail-
ure as in the case of the former Yugoslavia.
After the US finally intervened - for purely
domestic reasons - to bring about a hastily patched
political settlement that would barely hold water,
its implementation was entrusted to the care of
the European Union, in whose zone of responsi-
bility the ex-Yugoslav countries belong. In agree-
ment with the American peace-makers, Europe
strives to enclose the main agents of the most un-
fortunate scandal in its recent history within the
boundaries of its criteria, thus washing its hands
of them and somewhat repairing its loss of face.
In other words, these conditions are to serve as a
line of demarcation and reconciliation for the new
Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
with its constituent Federation and the Republika
Srpska. To repeat, at the core of this regional ap-
proach, however, are really Eastern Slavonia,
Dayton and the Kosovo problem.
These countries, in the view of the Fifteen,
before starting to establish closer relations with
the EU, must first prove that they are willing and
able to settle their relations with their immediate
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neighbours, by efficient association at economic
level without any forfeiture of their sovereign
rights, and yet with the idea looming in the back-
ground of establishing closer administrative and
legislative cooperation in the area stretching from
Zagreb to Athens, with the ultimate objective of
joining the EU. This "regional theme" is further
meant to make Croatia more firmly co-respon-
sible for all the post-war developments in the re-
gion.
Most areas with a customs union, free ex-
change of commodities, free movement of work-
ers, and the freedom of choice of residence tend
to opt for political association as well. In the last
century, the German customs union played an
important role in the unification of German king-
doms, princedoms and duchies into a single state.
The Benelux countries, on the other hand, were
the first in Europe to economically integrate into
a larger market and to form a customs union af-
ter World War II; but they retained their respec-
tive sovereign identities and became full members
of the EU as such.
In addition to economic factors, defence
and security considerations also playa major role.
The regional concept for the Baltic countries, for
the Visehrad countries, for the Middle East (Is-
rael, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, while Syria
and Egypt are too large entities for such a group-
ing), for the Maghreb countries, for Central
America and for some other regions strongly de-
pends on security aspects. In our case, the name
given to the region in question is the "Balkan re-
gion" (covering the countries of the former Yu-
goslavia, plus Albania and sometimes Bulgaria,
but without Slovenia), with its immediate
neighbour, Greece, playing a particular role as
member of the EU. At the moment, there does
not seem to exist a specific security concept for
this region, with timetables for inclusion in NATO
similarly to the Visehrad countries except
Slovakia.
It is sometimes claimed by the Croatian and
international public that this regional approach
is the result of the Croatian policy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Croatian counter-argument,
which is often accepted, is that our support for a
"single" or "partitioned" Bosnia and Herzegovina
would not have made much difference, because
we are doomed in any case to become involved in
support of the Bosnian Croats, whatever the po-
litical set-up in Bosnia, but especially if it threat-
ens them in any way. Questions are also some-
times heard, often from "well-meaning quarters"
at home and abroad, as to why we are so inten-
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sively involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina in de-
fence of a small minority without a prosperous
economy, major industrial centres, or oil and gas
deposits, while the Hungarians reconciled them-
selves to the loss of much larger minorities in
Romania, Slovakia and Voivodina, not to men-
tion the Germans in the Sudetenland, Silesia,
Pomerania and Prussia. Even though our diplo-
mats offer well-argumented answers, there is the
impression that these are not always fully ac-
cepted, with the implication that, although Serb
aggression is primarily to blame for the
radicalisation of the Moslems, Croat behaviour
in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina could
have also been a contributing factor, while at the
same time damaging the Croatian reputation
abroad. The periodic deterioration of the situa-
tion in Mostar further reinforces the belief of some
that Zagreb is not sufficiently supportive of the
efforts to settle these disputes.
The objectives of the regional approach, a
clear and detailed account of its options and terms,
is currently being drafted and prepared for dis-
cussion, to be finally adopted a few weeks hence.
Before attempting to describe the strategic
guidelines and conditions characteristic of the
regional approach, we shall give an outline of the
present situation of Croatia.
STEP BY STEP - RELATIONS TOWARDS EU
The European Union regulates its relations
with states which express the wish to become
members through a multi-phase process of gradu-
ated agreements, with several years of intensive
negotiation, conditioned by numerous structural
adjustments, legislative and sectorial changes, with
new freedoms and new constraints. Without go-
ing into further details of this process, let it only
be remembered that no individual agreement on
the adjustments needed for the preferential re-
gime, which constitutes the first stage, has yet been
reached between the Republic of Croatia and the
European Union, even though this status has been
granted to Macedonia and Albania.
Our relations with the EU are regulated on
the basis of the Agreement on Trade and Coop-
eration signed in 1980 between SFRY and EEC
and suspended by decision of the Council of Min-
isters in November 1991. Under the terms of this
suspension, at the proposal of the European Com-
mission, the Council of Ministers adopts unilat-
eral decisions at the end of each year on granting
preferential status to so-called "cooperative
states", Croatia among them. These are annual
decisions, and have nothing to do with the ex-
f··
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pected signing of the Agreement on Cooperation
between the EU and Croatia. The Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia has not yet received prefer-
ential treatment, although there were some hints
late in 1996 that this was planned. However, the
decision has been postponed until some future
date.
Regulating preferential trade regimes is
only one part of this agreement. The granting of
an autonomous preferential regime depends on
the will of the EU. More specifically, in the case
of our country, this involves preferential import
from Croatia into the EU of some products which
are specifically named and classified. In our case,
the result is an unspecified, internationally irregu-
lar situation, which could be changed with the sig-
nature of a new, direct and more favourable agree-
ment, introducing and consolidating the first stage
of relations between the Republic of Croatia and
the European Union .
This would not be a particularly important
step, but it would have symbolic significance, and
the next steps would be admission to the PHARE
Programme and the granting to Croatia of the sta-
tus of associate member on the strength of an
Association Agreement. Up to the moment of
signing the agreement on association, Croatia is
not obliged in principle to adopt reciprocal mea-
sures named in the agreement on the preferential
trade regime.
We must also bear in mind the fact that the
opinion prevails among the Fifteen not only that
Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia are
not democratic states, with the rule of law ensured
and free market reforms implemented, but that
also in the Republic of Croatia, due to the war-
time and post-war circumstances and an authori-
tarian one-party rule with some reminiscences of
the recent political past, there is room for the im-
provement of the uncompleted development of
democracy and the free market. This adds to the
regional approach a markedly didactic-moralistic
note, claiming to be a "guideline to democratic
improvement" en route to Brussels.
All countries within the South European
regional boundaries can become EU members
exclusively as "totally open democratic societies".
This apparently well-meaning professorial atti-
tude with a dose of arrogance indicates the inten-
tion to use the "conditionality" clauses on some
countries as a kind of Master of Democracy de-
gree, whereby the EU undertakes their democratic
education, followed by an examination, so as to
make up for and conceal the EU inefficiency and




The dilemmas and thus the wariness of the
EU members, who burnt their fingers on ex-Yu-
goslavia, and which have a bearing on the
regionalisation of the problem, could be summed
up as follows:
1. Will Bosnia and Herzegovina become
consolidated one day as a state, even as a phan-
tom state?
2. Will the Republika Srpska continue to
support the Dayton accords, meeting at least the
basic requirements, or is it waiting for a favourable
moment to secede?
3. Will not every government in Serbia and
the new Yugoslavia (supported by the Orthodox
Church) insist on a revision of the Dayton Agree-
ment, leading to a pro-Serbian solution of the
Brcko issue and to an intensified return of the
Serbs who fled from the former "Kraina" as well
as to the restitution of their property?
4. Given these circumstances, how is a
settlement to be reached of the Kosovo question
as the central issue, with Sandzak and
Voivodina as peripheral issues?
5. Will the present or the future Croatian
government continue to offer unambiguous sup-
port to Dayton, will it maintain Herzeg-Bosnia in
some form as a secret weapon or as a stand-by
solution, with secession when the time is right?
6. With the return of the displaced Croats
to Eastern Slavonia, will the Mostar syndrome be
repeated in some places, e.g. in Vukovar?
7. Will the Moslems-Bosniaks give up the
idea of creating a Moslem state?
8. Will the problem of Mostar, into whose
settlement much money and effort have been in-
vested, be truly and efficiently resolved
one day, with concrete help from Zagreb?
It is these crucial issues, the wish for con-
solidation, stabilisation and economic and com-
munication linkage, that the regional approach
endeavours to address. The accent is not on the
establishment of a political entity but primarily
economic, communication and energy association
of individual entities, with the main centres around
Zagreb and Belgrade.
The main guidelines observed by the EU
Foreign Relations Commission in formulating the
negotiating terms with the countries of Southeast
Europe are roughly the following:
Even if not quite the same for each coun-
try, e.g. for Croatia, the process will be protracted
and attended by a series of conditions, especially
at later stages.
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The philosophy of this process is step-by-
step progress, mainly in the four familiar stages
(agreement on preferential trade and customs
regime, which is non-binding on both sides; ad-
mission to PHARE; agreement on association,
mutually binding; and finally, agreement on mem-
bership, with deep-reaching rules and obligations).
All of this is further supplemented between phases
by additional adjustments and assessment of re-
sults.
The main criteria in assessing the fulfilment
of conditions will be the implementation of the
democratic principles of human rights, the rule
of law, freedom and independence of the media,
freedom of assembly, absence of inhumane or
degrading practices and of arbitrary arrest, mi-
nority protection, market reforms, across-the-bor-
der cooperation with neighbouring countries, co-
operation with the International War Crimes Tri-
bunal, the possibility for the return of refugees
and displaced persons.
For the first phase, EU considers it suffi-
cient to establish the existence of a genuine de-
sire and of signs of progress in the implementa-
tion of the above principles, aware that all condi-
tions cannot be met all at once. Thus, it does not
want to raise too many obstacles at the outset but
to enable a fast start in evolving relations with the
EU, conditional upon the development of inter-
regional relations.
As regards Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
conditions cannot be met by one party alone, and
cooperation is required by other parties as well.
In the case of FRY, stress will be laid on
cooperation in the implementation of the Day-
ton Agreement, on the issue of succession,
Kosovo, and on some other questions.
For each entity of the former Yugoslavia
which is undergoing the first stage of negotiations,
i.e. for Croatia, FRY and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, "individualised" conditions will be
formulated. There is a wish to extend the PHARE
Programme to all the countries in the region if it
is found that they meet the relevant conditions at
least to some degree.
In the next stage of relations (Association
Agreement - Europe Agreement), as in the case
of the Visehrad countries and Slovenia, the mini-
mum conditions will be gradually raised, accord-
ing to the evaluation of the fulfilment of the origi-
nal terms. These conditions are the application
of European standards of democracy, market re-
forms, human and minority rights, and especially
the absence of any discriminatory practices to-
wards the minorities and the media, the abolish-
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ment of price controls, cooperation in the imple-
mentation of peace treaties, cooperation with the
International Tribunal at the Hague, including the
extradition of persons indicted for war crimes, and
proven results in cooperation with neighbours.
For the Republic of Croatia, this list is ex-
pected to be augmented by some individually for-
mulated conditions: proof of the possibility for
Serb refugees to return to their original homes if
they so wish, absence of any intimidation of such
persons, the fulfilment of the obligations under
the basic agreement on Eastern Slavonia, the
opening of customs control posts on all borders,
the exercise of convincing pressure on the Bosnian
Croats to dissolve the Herzeg-Bosnian structures,
cooperation in establishing a genuinely unified
Town Council in Mostar, and cooperation in the
establishment and operation of federal institu-
tions.
A closer look at this summary of condition-
alities underlying the regional approach in the
conduct of negotiations with the countries of the
former Yugoslavia, without Slovenia, despite all
the justified criticisms and offence to our Central
European vanity, reveals an undeniable dose of
realpolitik logic in the positions of a portion of
the international community, which does not
mean, however, that we must uncritically accept
all these positions.
Furthermore, after so many people killed,
wounded, exiled, and after damage that can be
measured in billions, any normal collocutor will
have understanding for Croatia's aversion and
great mistrust at the mention of any regional re-
association within a framework from which we
recently escaped by superhuman concerted effort
rarely matched in history.
Not a single conversation conducted so far,
from the middle to the highest EU level, not a
single strategy paper, document or statement con-
tains an allusion to some institutionalisation or
disguised creation of a confederal or federal
pseudo-Yugoslavia.
The EU members are increasingly aware
that such a solution, even if certain parties might
desire it: would be highly sensitive and could even
be counterproductive. The EU has neither the
energy nor the technical and financial means to
re-establish on the ex-Yugoslav territory an
institutionalised grouping of nations, threatening
to become a potential hotbed of new conflicts.
If the EU and NATO did not overstrain
themselves to stop the aggression against Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is even less likely
that today, in the new circumstances, they will try
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to turn the wheel of history back ami attempt to
establish an expensive new post-Yugoslav struc-
ture. Baker, Delors, Mitterand, Carrington and
Owen tried it and failed, and others would have
as little success.
However, this is not to say that the regional
concept should be taken lightly. In the first place,
it provides a framework for the revival of the
broad spectrum of Yugo-nostalgic tendencies.
This approach to the problem might provide a
framework for new formulations of old slogans,
with "reconciliation and across-the-border asso-
ciation" as the main aim, and fertile soil for a fu-
ture multitude of intellectual theories, designs,
seminars and meetings, all under the mantle of
this EU-formulated and sponsored topic.
THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS
OF THE REGIONAL ApPROACH
Even though the regional approach does not
represent an "international conspiracy" for the
creation of a new Yugoslavia, and there are no
technical mechanisms or conditions for this at the
moment, it nevertheless possesses a number of
negative aspects which Croatia cannot afford to
ignore.
In its essence, the regional approach, by
according equal treatment to all, releases the au-
thors of the idea of Greater Serbia, from guilt for
aggression and wanton destruction, reducing the
conflict to civil war, without the right to repara-
tions and without a balanced pressure for the di-
vision of the inheritance among the successors,
even though this is not explicitly stated in the first
drafts of the European Commission.
Moreover, the regional approach, although
this is strenuously denied by the authors of this
philosophy, will provide the possibility to find con-
stantly new excuses for subtle attempts to slow
down the process and for the equalisation of all
parties, especially in the second stage of negotia-
tions, using the prolongations of admission to as-
sociated status as levers of pressure in the pursuit
of their objectives.
An additional objection to the regional ap-
proach is the fact that a sovereign state, member
of UN and the Council of Europe, even though
young and a very recent actor on the international
scene, is not permitted to choose its own "prefer-
ential partners", groupings and clubs. Instead,
solutions are being forced upon it, in a paternal-
istic and ostensibly well-meaning manner, to make
it a member of a regional club consisting of po-
litically, economically, and also emotionally,
"unpreferred" partners, from whom this country
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has only recently managed to separate itself.
This is reflected in discreet hints to hamper
Croatian efforts to conclude bilateral preferen-
tial economic and customs agreements with
CEFf A countries, claiming that we are not en-
titled to this since we are neither an associated
member of the EU nor a WTO member, and that
this should be made possible only with EU ap-
proval, primarily depending on progress in the
East European region.
Great Britain, for all its "positive attitude,
in consultation with its Euro-partners", recently
tried to thwart the extension of the preferential
agreement, threatening that next time, unless we
make progress in a number of issues (Eastern
Slavonia, the return of Serbs, Mostar, opening of
the line of separation, the Hague Tribunal), we
have to expect the cancellation of the existing pref-
erential agreement. In this obstructive attitude,
purportedly motivated by a strict advocacy of de-
mocracy where Croatia is concerned, compared
to the more tolerant positions of Austria and Ger-
many, a more balanced attitude ofItaly and lately
also of France, Great Britain has received the sup-
port, which is not without a political background,
of the uncompromising champions of human and
minority rights in Scandianvia, and sometimes also
in the Benelux countries.
Croatia has achieved independence by re-
lying on its own resources. But it would be wrong
and unreasonable to believe that it is an island
and that it can indefinitely walk alone on the road
to reconstruction, development and prosperity. It
should be clear to everybody that an isolationist
stance does not offer good prospects for the im-
peratives of our export and production, for com-
munication linkage, foreign investment, growth
of GNP, education, research, health service, the
needs of our consumers, our pensioners, our un-
employed, our disabled, and of our increasingly
impatient youth, who are calling for a greater
opening up. There is no need to stress that es-
pousal of national autarky, of greater indepen-
dence from other countries, is counterproductive
and should be instantly abandoned, because this
is something that even the rich Switzerland can
no longer afford, which is why it is already warily
knocking at the Brussels door.
All of this clearly indicates that cooperation
with the European Union, loved or unloved, is
one of the main options of Croatia's foreign policy.
This is not to say that for various, mostly domes-
tic, reasons we should stop stressing our disagree-
ment and principled objections against the re-
gional approach in its entirety, as a process that
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interest in their ideas and dilemmas, including
NATO expansion. All of this would lend addi-
tional strength to our role as a link, and "honest
broker" in many relations and on many sides rel-
evant to our economic interests and diplomatic
role.
The principled insistence on an Euro-At-
lantic position also presupposes a principled ex-
pression of interest in NATO. A letter in this sense
was sent in March 1996, declaring Croatia's in-
terest in joining the Partnership for Peace. Know-
ing NATO's views regarding our part of the world,
shaped by the SFOR-mandate and by the multi-
faceted, not to say hypocritical, attitude of the US,
who wants to take advantage of our "NATO-ea-
gerness" for its own current ends, it is my belief
that a temporary low-profile behaviour on that
issuewould leave Croatia more diplomatic breath-
ing space than is allowed by our all too frequent
and not particularly effective pro-NATO decla-
rations.
It would be useful to make a careful ap-
praisal whether for Croatia, a non-member of the
former Warsaw Treaty and not threatened by the
Russian Federation, NATO membership, apart
from the Partnership for Peace, is really a burn-
ing issue and whether a more balanced policy, as
practised e.g. by Finland, Austria or Slovakia,
would not offer a broader manoeuvring ground
in our foreign policy.
In conclusion, let me say that I believe that
Croatian foreign policy should be conducted in a
sober and balanced manner, without exclusive
commitment to a unilateral Euro-Atlantic policy
with bloc connotations. Instead, while continu-
ously insisting on our Euro-Atlantic option, our
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belonging to the Central European and Mediter-
ranean sphere, we could pursue in parallel a policy
of - why not - an individualised "light non-align-
ment", which would give us more space, less pres-
sure, and more freedom in acting as a link, a me-
diator, a broker, in keeping with the broad range
of our possibilities and interests and with our spe-
cific geographic position.
Today we cannot, and do not wish, to imi-
tate or continue the foreign policies of the Re-
public of Dubrovnik", the attempt by Petar
Zrinski'" to practicerea/politik, the efforts of mem-
bers of the Autonomous Party Sokcevic and
Mazuranic", or the policies of Supilo, Radle",
Macek or Josip Broz", for each moment in his-
tory has its specific set of circumstances. Never-
theless, these glances into our history indicate that
Croatian foreign policy, though fundamentally
oriented to the unification of all Croatian lands
into a single state, is at the same time tradition-
ally broadly conceived and complex.
The one final basic postulate is that the
Republic of Croatia will not consent, within the
framework of a regional approach or of any re-
gional association, to the loss of any sovereign or
political powers, except, one day, those which
other members have also voluntarily ceded in the
process of direct integration in the European
Union.
In this, we should be guided by our historic
realisation, under the leadership of Dr. Franjo
Tudjman, with future variants and adjustments
demanded by historic developments and dictated
by the imperative demands of Croatian sovereign
rights and interests.
•
1 Pacta conventa - a treaty concluded in 1102 between
12 Croatian tribes and the Hungarian King Coloman, pro-
viding for a personal union, non-payment of taxes and
military assistance.
2 Convention of Tsetin - in 1526, at Tsetin, the Croatian
Convention elected Archduke Ferdinand of Hapsburg, later
the German Emperor, as King of Hungary and Croatia, in
return for a certain number of troops for the defence of
the Kingdom and for a permanent stand-by contingent to
be kept in the Duchy of Corniola, the present-day Slovenia,
together with an undertaking to send supplies to the main
fortifications.
3 The Pragmatic Sanction - in 1712, the Croatian Con-
vention gave separate and independent approval to the
proposal that succession to the Hapsburg crown could go
to the female line.
4 The National Council- set up in Zagreb, in March 1918,
for the unification of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on the
territory of the disintegrating Austro-Hungary, to which the
Croatian Convention, following its decision to sever all ties
with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, temporarily trans-
ferred supreme and executive powers; the thousand-years-
old Croatian Convention was never convened again.
5 ZAVNOH - the session of the Antifascist Council of the
People's Liberation of Croatia, which annulled all treaties
between Serbia and Povelic with Italy and annexed to
Croatia all occupied Croatian territories, including Rijeka,
Istria and Zadar, within the framework of the community
of peoples of Yugoslavia.
6 - Baron Josip Sokcevic (1811- 1896), Croatian Ban and
general;
-Ivan Mazuranic (1814-1890), Croatian poet and Ban;
- Ivan pl. Kukuljevic-Sokcinski (1816-1870), historian and
politician;
- Baron Ambroz Vrcnyczony-Dobrinovic (1801-1870), first
administrator of Croatian autonomous finances, deputy
of Croatia in the extended Imperial Council;
- Ljudevit pI. Farkas Vukotinovic (1813- 1893), poet, poli-
tician, botanist.
These were the leading figures in the Autonomous Party,
whose aim was the unification of all Croatian lands within
a federal Hapsburg Monarchy, a kind of broad and toler-
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ant Croatoslavia, politically, economically and culturally
attractive to all Southern Slavs, including those still under
Ottoman sovereignty. All of this was to have been sanc-
tioned under a direct arrangement with the Austrian Crown
without Hungarian co-tutelage.
7 - Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905), bishop, patron
of the arts, chief donator of the Yugoslav (today Croatian)
Academy of Sciencesand Arts; advocated federalism within
the Monarchy, the strengthening of ecumenism, and closer
ties between all, especially the South, Slavs.
8 - Frano Supilo (1870-1917), publicist and politician,
member of the Yugoslav Committee formed abroad dur-
ing World War I; advocated a broadly federalist Yugosla-
via.
- Stjepan Redic (1871-1928), leader of the Croatian Peas-
ant Party, the most important political grouping between
the two world wars; died of wounds sustained in an assas-
sination attempt in the Belgrade parliament.
9 The foreign policy of Dubrovnik aimed at maintaining
good and peaceful relations with all neighbours, and with
INCOME DIFFERENTIALS IN THE EU IN THE
PAST AND IN THE FUTURE
At the time of the first enlargement of the
European Community, in 1973, the original six
member states constituted a relatively closely knit
and homogeneous trading zone. GDP per head
of population (in purchasing power standards) in
Italy stood only some 20% below that of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, with Belgium, France
and the Netherlands within this range and only
Luxembourg substantially above the FRG.
The 1973 enlargement entailed the entry of
two new member states (Denmark and the United
Kingdom) with per capita GDP close to the me-
dian of the founding members and one new mem-
ber state (Ireland) with a per capita GDP only
about 50% of that of Germany and 60% of that
of Italy.
In 1981 the then nine EC member states
were joined by Greece with a per capita GDP close
to that of Ireland and in 1986 by Spain and Portu-
galwith a GDP level respectively somewhat higher
than and somewhat lower than that of Greece.
The two latter enlargements, involving three coun-
tries with a total population of 58 million, conse-
quently resulted in a significant shift of the geo-
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more distant protectors of its free trade, such as Venice
and Istanbul.
10 Count Petar Zrinski (1621-1671), Ban, military leader
in the Thirty-Year War against the Turks, disappointed with
the terms of the Vosvcr Peace, which did not provide for
the restitution of Croatian and Hungarian lands, consid-
ered a more direct settlement with Turkey, on more
favourable terms for Croatia.
11 See note 6.
12 See note 8.
13 - Vlatko Macek (1879-1964), succeeded Stjepan Redic
at the head of the Croatian Peasant Party; negotiated an
agreement with the government in Belgrade on the cre-
ation of a large autonomous Banate of Croatia, with parts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), communist fighter against
the German and Italian occupation, military leader, states-
man; severed the ties with Stalin; co-founder of the non-
aligned bloc.
graphical and economic balance in the EC in
favour of low-income Mediterranean countries.
The German unification, furthermore,
brought into the EC East Germany with a popu-
lation of some 16 million and a per capita GDP
some 30% of that of West Germany or 60% of
that of the level of Portugal.
The 1995 enlargement, involving the entry
of Austria, Sweden and Finland, on the contrary
entailed the addition of high-income countries of
Northern "obedience" and thus, to some extent,
re-established the North-South equilibrium exist-
ing among the original Six.
In 1994 the level of GDP per capita within
the EU, converted at current rates of exchange,
ranged from about 7,000 ECU in Greece and
Portugal to some 25,000 in Denmark (and even
more in Luxembourg), corresponding to a spread
of about 1:3.5. Enlargement of the EU to include
the ten CEECs would, first and foremost, entail a
pronounced rise in income differentials within the
Union.
Among the candidate countries only
Slovenia has an income level comparable to that
of Greece and Portugal. In fact, at some 6,000
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